"A New Marx" by Roberto Fineschi

A New Marx

by Roberto Fineschi

[Transcript, with minimal editing, of the opening lecture of the ‘Officina Marx 2018’ series, held at Le stanze delle memoria on 22 October 2018. For a more detailed discussion of many of the issues raised, see: R. Fineschi, A New Marx. Interpretation and Perspectives after the New Historical-Critical Edition (MEGA2), Rome, Carocci, 2008]

I

The title of my talk is ‘A New Marx’. On the one hand, it is a somewhat paradoxical title because Marx is a well-known author, widely read and much interpreted. Rivers of ink have been spilled over him, and not only that: his face was emblazoned on political banners, his name has been used by many and in many different ways as ideological political capital to legitimise historical movements, and even states.

In this sense, to the extent that he was used politically, it was inevitable that an orthodoxy would emerge, because political movements that become institutions require an official, eternal truth which, clearly, for the sake of identity and self-legitimisation, inevitably tends to solidify into formulas that gradually lose their grip on reality and become a set of stock phrases to be repeated on anniversaries and during celebrations.

This is certainly, in part, the fate that befell Marx’s work in the Soviet Union or in Eastern Europe, where it was the official doctrine of an institution and could only be true, unchangeable, and certain for ever and ever. Dialectical Materialism is the prime example of par excellence. Among the key elements of these various formulations was, of course, the notion that ‘real socialism’ constituted the realisation of Marx’s theories: as ‘real socialism’, by coming into being, confirmed Marx’s predictions—the existence of an intrinsic historical necessity whereby that outcome was ultimately inevitable. 

This ideology possessed great strength and, I would say, almost a sense of legitimacy in its day, because it gave courage and hope to activists. It was as if to say: if the outcome of our struggle is the direction towards which the course of history is tending, and this will inevitably happen, then we are strong because we are riding the wave of history; all this legitimises our political action. This ideology, which seemed to positively support the historical-political movement at the time of its expansion, sounded like a contradiction when socialism collapsed and came to an end (having already faced difficulties since at least the post-war period): if Marx had previously been right – because he would have argued that so-called real socialism was the verification of his predictions – its collapse, crushing everything under the rubble of the Wall, buried not only that experience but Marx himself; Marx, too, ended up in the dustbin of history alongside real socialism. Thus, the uninvited guest in these discussions about Marx is often real socialism itself.

Much of this new research – which I, too, am carrying out, as are others – aims, as a starting point, to show that real socialism, for better or for worse – because positive things did happen as well – is not one and the same as Marx.

Of course, it is not true that real socialism has nothing to do with Marx; they are simply not the same thing. If we start from this premise, his theory probably still has something to say to the present day. This is, in a way, the aim of this endeavour. Not least because, on closer inspection, Marx says very little about real socialism or, rather, about the future society. If you read Marx’s many works, the future society is merely alluded to, touched upon in a few sentences; it is not theorised in all its complexity. There are some ideas, such as rational management, but there is a world of difference between stating the need for rational management of the economy and then showing how this works and can be structured – and Marx does not do the latter. In reality, Marx essentially studies the capitalist mode of production; this is the subject of his research – he studies how capitalism works. This distinction is important because one cannot hold him responsible for everything that happened afterwards. It is an open-ended discussion that lends itself to multiple interpretations. This generally marks the beginning of the response to the first objection that is raised, namely the alleged identity between real socialism and Marx.

The second objection raised is that Marx spoke essentially of the industrial working class; he saw the working class as the historical agent in opposition to capital, the working class identified above all with the factory worker, the mass worker; and that, as this figure disappears or is scaled back, the ground would be pulled from under one of the fundamental premises and, therefore, once again, Marx would have been wrong or would have been right only within certain limits. Some people today therefore theorise about post-modern, post-industrial, post-workerist society; seeking subjects other than mass workers would be to go beyond Marx – that is, to use Marx but in order to transcend him, to see how his theory was limited and how there is a need to go beyond it. I believe, however, that the issue should instead be addressed by bearing in mind the different levels of ‘abstraction’ at which the theory is developed.

Before delving into the matter, however, I would like to make a brief digression regarding the publication of the new critical edition of the works of Marx and Engels, the *Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe*. Some of their traditional works have been profoundly affected by these editorial changes.

II

As for *German Ideology*, the new edition was published a few months ago and contains significant changes, particularly regarding the famous first chapter on Feuerbach, in which, according to some traditional interpretations, one might even find the foundation of the dialectic between the forces of production and the relations of production – the cornerstones of historical materialism. This first chapter does not actually exist as an independent draft; it is a collage of various preparatory materials; indeed, some headings were in the margins and have been moved to the top. Rather than a book, these were galley proofs of articles written for a quarterly journal that was never actually published. It had all been left there, and in the 1920s Ryazanov, then editor of the first MEGA (the first attempt to produce a historical-critical edition, which subsequently foundered), delighted to have found the famous book left to the ‘gnawing’ criticism of mice mentioned in the Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, structured it in a manner that was not always philologically acceptable. The intervention of Adoratsky, the new editor of the MEGA following Ryazanov’s purge, further worsened the situation by restructuring the chapter on Feuerbach in a wholly arbitrary manner. These texts have given rise to many interpretations; after all, books have their own destiny, so even these philologically imperfect interpretations have produced theories, etc., etc., which in themselves have their own merit; the point at present, however, is that it is possible to return to Marx—that is, one can finally read the texts as he wrote them. This applies in particular to *Capital*, Marx’s mature, unfinished work, to which he devoted practically his entire life, at least from 1857 onwards, writing three colossal manuscripts in which he sketched out the entire theory three times; broad outlines, of course, before publishing the first volume in several editions with numerous variations, and subsequently attempting to publish the second and third volumes without success. It is well known that, after his death, Engels published the second and third volumes. In the introductions, he explains the nature of the editorial work he undertook, though without recounting the whole story. Now, at last, all the original manuscripts on which Engels worked have been published, and what emerges clearly is that the books were not finished; they were far from being in a publishable form. In particular, the main manuscript on which Engels worked for the third book dates from 1864–65; Marx died in 1883 and the book was published, edited by Engels, in 1894. In fact, this third volume is therefore the least developed, because Marx published the first volume in 1867 and then republished it two more times; the manuscript for the third volume is thus an old, largely unfinished manuscript, containing an entire section entitled ‘The Confusion’. Speaking of his own work, he himself considered this section to be confused; it is a list of quotations on credit and fictitious capital, clearly showing that he was still working through the issues and did not have a clear grasp of the ideas. To give an example of how Engels altered this section – not because he had any ill intentions, but simply because, in order to be published, a book must be finished and the manuscript was not, so he had to finish it himself. From this entire section, entitled ‘The Confusion’, Engels extracted 11 chapters, each with a title and a structure, generally consisting of quotations linked by a short paragraph written by Engels – an introductory remark by Engels, the quotation, followed by a connecting remark by Engels. This is not to suggest that Engels was a deceiver or a traitor – far from it; Engels sought to carry out his work as honestly as possible. The point is that the book was unfinished and that he completed it, in the sense that he published it as a finished work, when in reality it was a mass of material in which there were countless loose ends. 

To mention just a few of the classic problems of Marxian interpretation, the transformation of value into prices was far from complete; it was a composite exposition. Even the tendency for the rate of profit to fall was far from complete. Not to mention fictitious capital, where there is this whole section known as ‘confusion’. If a book of this sort is published as a finished work, it results as an aporetic book in which certain parts are at clash with other parts. For example, the whole debate on the transformation of value into prices, which is one of the classic themes of Marxian exegesis, arises from presenting as complete a development that was, in fact, moving in conflicting and evolving directions. Returning to Marx’s texts allows us to make use of these paths that were open to moving forward, to explore Marx’s argument in greater depth beyond the historical impasse in which it ended up; for without these new insights – if we stick to the traditional texts – everything has truly already been said, and probably even more than everything. The traditional Marx has been read, discussed and re-discussed; it is truly difficult to add anything.

The ‘new’ Marx is therefore not merely new in terms of interpretation but also in his textual foundation; that is to say, he is quite literally a new Marx to be read, comprising new or revised texts.

Incidentally, the critical edition has also uncovered previously unknown manuscripts, and thirty-two volumes of annotations by both Marx and Engels are currently being published. When they were studying a book, they would copy out key passages and then comment on them; there are thirty-two volumes of such material! So it is now truly possible to go through the text line by line, researching and re-examining – even critically – old notions in the light of this new textual evidence.

III

Here are a few examples to illustrate why it is so important to return to the text. Anyone who has ever studied Marx knows that he is associated with the theory of historical materialism. In your opinion, how many times does Marx use the term ‘historical materialism’ in his entire body of work? Never, not even once. Or take the ‘philosophy of praxis’. How many times, in his entire body of work, does Marx use the expression ‘philosophy of praxis’? Never. For those who have studied economics, Marx is the philosopher of the labour theory of value. How many times did Marx use the expression ‘labour theory of value’ in his work?

Never, not even once. The paradoxical thing is that all the chapters in philosophy or economics textbooks use terms to define Marx that he never actually used himself. It is therefore crucial to return to Marx’s own text to see what Marx actually said.

Viewed at a high level of abstraction, his theory proves to have surprising long-term predictive power, in that it theorises a whole series of phenomena that are more relevant now than they were when he wrote. This is what is truly impressive. For example, let us take globalisation; Marx does not use the term ‘globalisation’, but rather, in a more Hegelian vein, he speaks of ‘the universalisation of individual labour and vice versa’; the interlinking of the production and reproduction of humankind on a global scale, according to Marx, is one of the long-term trends of the capitalist mode of production; he mentions this in the Manifesto, but he first theorised it in 1857–58, at a time when there was still a long way to go before it reached the pervasive scale we see today. His theory predicted, a hundred years in advance, long-term trends that would develop – and have developed. According to him, the capitalist mode of production tends to bring about other changes, such as an exponential increase in labour productivity. Even it is difficult to argue that this is not the case, because labour productivity has increased dramatically. Marx is a theorist not only of the cooperative dimension of labour but also of the process by which science and the automation of labour are determined as a long-term trend of the capitalist mode of production; and here too, it seems to me, he was right, precisely by developing the theory of relative surplus value and demonstrating how the capitalist mode of production, paradoxically, on the one hand is based on the exploitation of living labour but on the other tends to expel living labour from the production process, thereby increasingly reducing the proportion of necessary labour. This fundamental contradiction means that the individual worker’s contribution becomes increasingly specialised and increasingly limited, to the point where it is so routine that it can be replaced by a machine. This is the theoretical basis for conceiving of automation on a mass scale. Paradoxically, the claims about the end of work are not so inconsistent with what Marx said, not because work actually ceases to exist, but because the intrinsic tendency of the capitalist mode of production to rely on labour whilst simultaneously displacing it is already underway, and in the long term this leads to a process of widespread displacement and, consequently, mass unemployment. A massive wave of mass unemployment which, from a certain point onwards, is no longer even elastic but rigid, and cannot be reabsorbed by further expansion of production. In short, here too, in my view, current dynamics are in line with what Marx hypothesised.

IV

The crisis. This, too, is a topic on which Marx has, in fact, been on everyone’s lips, given that orthodox theories offer no explanation for the crisis. If you study macroeconomics textbooks, you’ll read about frictional crises, readjustment crises and rigidities that can be alleviated through external interventions; however, these do not imply structural cyclicality, meaning that the crisis is a constant, recurring element of social reproduction. Therefore, when faced with crises such as those of 2007 and 2008 – which are, in part, still ongoing – our official economists are at a loss for words. They finally admit that that the crisis exists and that Marx is right, because there is overproduction, because the capitalist mode of production tends to produce regardless of solvent demand – that is, regardless of who can pay – and so ultimately floods the market with a quantity of unsaleable goods; prices collapse, and financial speculation cannot respond to this objective dynamic.

So much so that we are once again talking about Karl Marx, Keynes, Schumpeter – all those authors who ultimately cast doubt on the idea that a pre-established harmony would put everything back in its place. In Marx’s theory, the crisis is structural; the capitalist mode of production will necessarily and cyclically produce crises – nothing could be more normal: of course there is a crisis, because that is how the capitalist mode of production works.

The final part of *Capital* is devoted to credit and fictitious capital – in short, to finance – and this, again, at a time when finance certainly existed but was not developed to the extent that it is today; Marx clearly sees what the trends are. The capitalist mode of production, in its process of accumulation, at a certain point tends to split and present, as two apparently real accumulation on the one hand and fictitious accumulation on the other. The entire final part of the theory in *Capital* centres on the analysis of the relationship between these two types of accumulation, and how fictitious accumulation affects real accumulation and vice versa; he therefore clearly has in mind the problem that the two do not coincide immediately – that is, that there are levels of separation which also entail a multiplication of the fictitious elements in circulation; it is not just money, but also shares, credit notes and currencies. In short, Marx does not analyse the complexity of this whole subject to its full extent, partly because, when he theorised it, it had not yet developed to the level it has reached today. However, it is not true, as many claim, that Marx did not considered finance; on the contrary, he places the subject of finance precisely as the culminating point of his theory of *Capital*; it is there that the entire complexity of the system becomes even more intricate. This is a whole area in which one can explore further. Yet in Marx there is a foundation from which to begin.

V

I would now like to return, as I was saying at the beginning, to the question of the factory worker, because some argue that Marx was wrong on the issue of the worker – that the factory worker was supposed to be the subject, and so on and so forth. He was wrong about the revolution because it was supposed to take place in England, in the advanced countries, and so on and so forth; so we need to address these aspects.

In my view, an explanation can be found here, and the starting point is essentially this: what is Marx actually talking about? Is he talking about capitalism during the Industrial Revolution? Is he talking about capitalism in general? In other words, is it a sort of theorisation of what was happening in England in the 1800s, or is it a more general theory of capitalism that identifies underlying mechanisms which are not necessarily confined to that historical phase? In my view, the answer is the latter, and here too philology helps. Firstly, how many times does Marx use the word ‘capitalism’ throughout his theory? Once. Just once. What Marx is always talking about is the capitalist mode of production, and he himself states that he will use England as an example, as it is a most developed and therefore the country in which the capitalist mode of production is most apparent, manifesting itself in its fullness. But in reality, what he is discussing are the fundamental laws of this system, and if we, bearing this in mind, examine his theory on the subject, this allows us to think about it in a different way.

The mass factory worker – this traditional interpretation emerges from the section in the first volume of *Capital* entitled ‘The Production of Relative Surplus Value’, in which Marx demonstrates the material and organisational transformations that the mode of labour undergoes once it is subsumed under capital, that is, once it is integrated into the process of capital valorisation. He mentions three figures, all of which are extremely well-known: 1) co-operation, the co-operative nature of labour which increases its productivity; 2) manufacture, in which the individual worker becomes a ‘partial’ worker—that is, no longer capable of carrying out the entire process alone but able to do so by collaborating with others; and finally 3) large-scale industry, in which the individual worker even becomes an appendage of an objective process, performing only ancillary tasks; indeed, they may well disappear altogether with automation. Along these lines, the factory worker has traditionally been identified as the culmination of this process and therefore as the principal antagonist to capital, precisely because labour was organising itself in this manner. This interpretation is clearly legitimate, and historically true in certain phases, in that when Marx was writing, this seemed to be the actual course of history. Subsequently, the expansion of large-scale industry even after the Second World War, seemed to confirm this process of the factory worker becoming the predominant form of labour; then, as you know, at least in the more advanced countries, there was a period of stagnation, a decline in the industrial sector, the shift towards the service sector – in short, offshoring – and, through mechanisation, a process of apparent reduction in the presence of the factory worker, thus providing factual evidence that this theory was incorrect.

Here, we can see how Marx approaches the subject on two levels: one more theoretical and formal, and the other more historical and descriptive. The historical–descriptive approach is the one most frequently cited – a sort of phenomenology of the transformations of labour in industrial society. However, if we look at the formal aspects, we actually identify changes in the way people work that do not necessarily apply only to manufacturing or large-scale industry. Let me try to explain this more clearly.

With manufacturing, we see the division of labour: the worker is no longer able to carry out the entire process but only a small part of it; with large-scale industry, we see ‘appendixisation’. However, these stages can be interpreted as ‘phases’ in which historically new ways of working emerged. Did these ways of working – which emerged thanks to the capitalist mode of production in the form of manufacturing and large-scale industry, and thus the division of labour, subordination to an objective set by the capitalist, and so on – cease to exist with the decline of large-scale industry or manufacturing? I do not think so. Because even in the most computerised of production chains, even the freelancer sitting at home filling in a short article using pre-formatted software that may well have been supplied from India, works in exactly the same formal ways: this is a process of fragmentation and subordination that corresponds exactly to these modes of work. The worker is fragmented, subordinate and reduced to an appendage. These are therefore modes that can be categorised within that theory; they are nothing other than that theory.

Even the form of employment contract that is not necessarily wage-based – the freelancer, for example – is not a subordinate worker in contractual terms but, in practice, is one; indeed, it is even worse because they bear the burden of downtime. Let’s take the example of someone who actually works five hours out of every eight in an office each day, for which they are paid; if their employer cannot keep them working for eight hours, their idle time is a cost, because the employer pays for eight hours but the worker only works five. If, on the other hand, this person is a freelancer, we have a sort of piecework arrangement: the five hours during which they are not productive are borne by the worker; therefore, all of this fits perfectly within the system of cost reduction that is the dynamic of relative surplus-value production. If we consider the formal transformations in the way we work, then, those categories originally devised to describe manufacturing and large-scale industry still apply. These are comprehensive processes with externally determined aims that subordinate and fragment the activity of individuals working for the valorisation of capital, exactly as they did before.

In this context, it is interesting to see how the term ‘operaio’ has traditionally been translated. In traditional editions—not only in Italian but across the Neo-Latin languages—if you read the text, you will find that sometimes the term ‘operaio’ is used and sometimes ‘lavoratore’. In reality, if you look at the German text, the same word is always used: ‘Arbeiter’. This choice to translate in one way or another has always been a decision made by the translator, who, for their good reasons believed that in certain circumstances it was better to use ‘operaio’ rather than ‘lavoratore’, but the German text always uses ‘Arbeiter’. And ‘Arbeiter’ derives from ‘arbeiten’ and means ‘to work’; the final ‘-er’ is like our ‘-tore’ in Italian – it is the suffix used to form a noun from a verb. Marx speaks of the worker as the counterpart to capital: the Lohn-Arbeiter, that is, wage labour; the concept of wage labour is broad, much broader not only than that of the ‘operaio’ but also broader than that of the ‘productive worker’, who is merely employed in the production process. The ‘Lohn-Arbeiter’ is the individual who participates in a subordinate, fragmented or even semi-automatic manner in the process of capital valorisation.

The process of capital valorisation is not, in fact, merely the process of capital production—that is, the first volume of *Capital*—but also the process of capital circulation; it encompasses the overall configurations of the system, which are the three volumes of *Capital*. The chapter that Marx entitles ‘Classes’ is the last in the third volume; it is not in the first volume. Therefore, the problem for anyone seeking, on the basis of these premises, to develop a theory of political subjects and political action is, on the one hand, a problem of fundamental definitions: that is, what is ‘the other of capital’, what is the subject antagonistic to capital? Marx speaks of wage labour. Wage labour – placing great emphasis on the factory worker because this worked well in those specific historical circumstances, though more generally speaking, wage labour. This conception of wage labour as fragmented, subordinate, a link in the great chain of capitalist reproduction does not in itself identify just a particular subject; it is the fundamental premise for conceiving more concrete configurations. It is one thing to speak of Italian capitalism within the European Community in 2018, and quite another to discuss the capitalist mode of production in general: in between there are many intermediate levels; there is, for example, a theory of the state, of international trade, of the world market, and of how this takes shape and creates more complex subjectivities.

Even mass unemployment is perfectly functional to wage labour; it is simply the other side of the coin – it is that section of the workforce which the capitalist mode of production renders unusable. It is not that they are unusable in the abstract, but that they are unusable because they do not add value to capital. In other words: even this mass unemployment is part of the game. Clearly, if I have political projects, I cannot speak to these people as if they were wage labourers; I must explain and structure my argument so that they understand that their not being wage labourers is part of the wage system, that they are functionally non-wage labourers because they do not add value to capital and therefore exist within the same system as wage labourers. This is not possible without underpinning theories – not just theories of the capitalist mode of production, but also of specific forms of capitalism – and factual analyses, specifically of Italian capitalism in 2018 within the context of the European Union, and so on.

VI

Why was Marx wrong in his political predictions? Because he, too, failed to develop these intermediate levels; he was unable to complete all this intermediate theorising before his death – indeed, he died before finishing his theory of the capitalist mode of production in general, which remains unfinished; yet, on the other hand, he wrote *Capital* to give the working class the greatest weapon to hurl against the bourgeoisie, to quote one of his famous passages. So what does he do? He becomes the first Marxist in history, attempting to apply his abstract theory to concrete political ends, whilst facing the problem of this vast gap between general and particular levels. And indeed, he gets it all wrong: there is no revolution in England, nor does the English working class act as the vanguard; indeed, the revolution takes place in a corner of the world where capitalism was present only sporadically. However, in my view, this attempt at reconstruction that I am proposing also allows us to account for these very failures of Marx himself; thus, when Marx speaks of the inevitable revolution, he is engaging in politics, seeking to tell the workers he is addressing that they are justified in their struggle, even if he could not yet tell them so scientifically, because scientifically he had not yet completed his work.

Marx’s original plan comprised six volumes: *Capital*, *Wage Labour*, *Rent*, *The State*, *International Trade* and *The World Market* – six volumes of which he barely managed to write the first, squeezing in a small section of the second and a small section of the third; it is, therefore, a largely unfinished project. Despite its incompleteness, his is nonetheless one of the few theories that explains so much about the present, and that is why we are making this effort to go back to the sources – to reclaim, as far as possible, an authentic formulation on which to work. Because the foundations are sound; in its basic outlines, it has been able to explain long-term trends. In my view, the challenge for us today—who in some way draw on this theory—is to move forward and try to continue the work Marx began, whilst, of course, recognising all its limitations, including those I have outlined. In reality, the limitations do exist: the failure to theorise the intermediate levels, and consequently the search for shortcuts to intervene immediately – that is, for answers to day-to-day political issues based on abstract theory – is not immediately possible. In that formulation, there can be no answer to this.

I have not gone into the details of more specialist theoretical issues concerning aporetic points in the theory, for example the theory of transformation. I do not know how familiar you are with this topic, but it is one of the most significant issues in the traditional debate amongst economists: in the third volume of *Capital*, Marx is said to have failed to transform values into prices, that is, to demonstrate how a theory of production prices develops from the theory of value. You might ask, why is this such an important issue? It is so important because it is not merely a theoretical assumption, but a purely political one: even those who raised this criticism did not particularly care about the transformation, because if you look at the orthodox theories taught in macroeconomics, some are based on premises that are truly laughable, with utterly arbitrary assumptions.

Even a great many ‘orthodox’ theorists recognise this, but they turn a blind eye to it in order to the theory forward and develop it. They aren’t that strict. So why are they so strict with poor Karl? Because the contradiction between the first and third volumes would destroy the coherence of the theory, and if the theory doesn’t hold water, what else doesn’t hold water either? Exploitation doesn’t hold water, class antagonism doesn’t hold water; all the political consequences of the theory collapse together. That is why they have attacked this aspect as much as they possibly could. It is, in fact, aporetic; it is truly a difficult point in the text; some of the traditional criticisms do indeed raise legitimate questions. In my view, the philological reconstruction must provide answers to these legitimate doubts and, at the same time, be capable of responding positively, preserving exploitation and everything else alongside the transformation. So, whilst these matters may seem like philological quibbles, the real point is to resolve concrete theoretical issues, the resolution of which also lends legitimacy to possible theories and political movements based on this theory. This is the practical perspective of this type of research.

The key point is this: Marx is a truly ‘new’ author, with a renewed textual basis that allows us to attempt to break free from the shallows of traditional debate. It is not a question of proposing, in the abstract, new interpretations that are more or less fanciful, more or less legitimate, more or less debated and re-debated – because everything has truly already been said on this subject; the point is that Marx is different in his texts, and given that this is a theory which, over the long term, has already demonstrated great predictive power, it is well worth seeing if we can glean something from it, because it is truly the only theory that explains crisis, globalisation, conflict and financialisation – it encompasses it all – so… thank you, Marx, and let’s get to work!

Thank you all for your attention. 

“Je ne suis pas marxiste”? Or, Marx quoted out of context

“Je ne suis pas marxiste”? 

Or, Marx quoted out of context

di Roberto Fineschi

The above-quoted statement by Marx referred to Lafargue and the ‘collectivists’, who at that time were branded with the derogatory term ‘Marxists’, and certainly not to the theoretical system to which Marx, together with Engels, made the greatest contribution.

Time and again, we hear the famous statement attributed to Marx: ‘I am not a Marxist’. The intention is to draw a line between the old Moro and the political movements that claim to follow in his footsteps, today as in the past. However, this is a misleading and out-of-context use of the phrase and is therefore, in essence, incorrect; I shall try to explain why, starting with the facts.

1) We know of this phrase thanks to… Engels – yes, the very man whom some even claim to be the inventor of Marxism. He quotes it in a letter to Bernstein, stating that Marx had used it in a conversation with Lafargue to distance himself from the French group of ‘collectivists’ led by Lafargue and Guesde [1].

So the source is Engels, and the context is that of the French debate in the early 1880s.

2) It must be made very clear that at that time the modern-day meaning of the word ‘Marxism’ did not exist. What did it mean then? Something very specific and, essentially, derogatory. It seems that the expression suffered the same fate as other words that later became ‘normal’, such as ‘Gothic’ and ‘Baroque’ – that is, terms that originally had a negative connotation. Bakunin had already introduced the use of ‘Marxian’ and ‘Marxist’ in this sense during the controversies that erupted within the First International. Similarly, within the French debate in the early 1880s, the group ‘close’ to Marx’s positions, active around the newspaper *L’égalité*, was labelled by its opponents as ‘Marxist’: ‘Marx’s clique’, so to speak. Marx himself refers to this discussion as a debate between ‘Marxists’ and ‘anti-Marxists’ [2].

Thus, at that time, ‘Marxism’ was a derogatory term with which the opponents of the collectivists denounced their enemies, regarding them as close to Marx’s positions.

Why was the group ‘labelled’ in this way? Quite simply, because Marx and Engels had in fact substantially contributed to the drafting of the political, economic and social programme put forward by that section of the party in its political activities. In short: it was true. Marx was a Marxist even in this narrow sense [3].

Why, then, did Engels and Marx distance themselves from the term? Whilst the French group was evidently close to Marx, it certainly did not represent his ideas and theory in a complete or adequate manner. In fact, at that time, the term did not refer to a comprehensive world view, but simply to an orientation and a source of inspiration with which Marx did not feel comfortable associating his own name, particularly because it had taken the form of a local internal conflict, of parochial squabbles, in which, moreover, the name had a derogatory connotation.

To conclude: assuming it was actually uttered, Marx’s remark simply means that, however close he actually was to them and however directly he had influenced their ideas and programmes, he did not want Guesde and Lagargue’s French group – which was becoming increasingly parochial – to be identified with a (derogatory) epithet inspired by his name. This, in short, is the meaning of the remark.

How did a "positive" meaning of the term emerge? It was only after Marx’s death that Engels, albeit with little conviction, came to accept the use of the term in a positive sense, endorsing the organisation of a ‘congress of Marxists’ at which he sought to bring together all those whom, amongst the various socialist and communist groups, he considered most faithful to Marx’s thought, precisely to counter those centrifugal and sectarian forces which he believed had emerged within the various factions in different countries. Here, the term takes on a decidedly different meaning, coming to denote a more general conception of the world based on ‘scientific socialism’, the construction of which Engels evidently aimed for consciously, as is indeed demonstrated by his tireless activity in the final years of his life. However, it was undoubtedly Kautsky who pushed most forcefully – breaking with Engels’s reservations – towards a positive use of the term as an identifying feature of a political faction. Beyond its contingent origins, it is therefore Kautsky, even more so than Engels, who encouraged the use of the category ‘Marxism’ in its commonly understood sense [4].

If, in extremely general terms, we call ‘Marxism’ a movement based on Marx’s theory that aims to build an international organisation of workers capable of transforming present-day society – and thereby enabling these workers to develop an awareness of their own historical role – then Marx was undoubtedly a Marxist. His entire life as a political activist demonstrates this beyond any shadow of a doubt. Whether one chooses to call this political practice ‘Marxism’ or by any other name does not alter its substance. Moreover, the attempt to realise this project had already been undertaken by Marx himself, together with Engels, during his lifetime. To suggest that Marx did not approve of *Anti-Dühring* (to which, incidentally, he contributed), or that he was unaware of or did not endorse Engels’s pamphlets on the transition of socialism from utopia to science, etc., seems, quite frankly, ahistorical.

Marx and Marxism – or rather, Marxisms – are not the same thing; this is almost self-evident. But it is not true that they are not interconnected; the real issue, in my view, is the reconstruction of developments, mediations, but also differences or contradictions between the spectrum of historical Marxisms and the old Moro’s theory of capital; certainly not imagining a Marx who was distant or even sarcastic towards the prospect of organised political action based on a system of ideas linked to his theory.

Notes:

[1] Engels’s letter to Bernstein of 2–3 November 1882: ‘Now, what in France goes by the name of ‘Marxism’ is in fact a very peculiar phenomenon, so much so that Marx once said to Laf[argue]: ‘ce qu’il a de certain c’est que moi, je ne suis pas marxiste’ [what is certain is that I am not a Marxist]” (K. Marx, F. Engels, Letters 1880–1883 (March), Milan, Edizioni Lotta Comunista, 2008, p. 

279). Marx’s statement is quoted in French in the original.

[2] Letter from Marx to Engels dated 30 September 1882, in K. Marx, F. Engels, Letters, op. cit., p. 266.

[3] See note 43 in K. Marx, F. Engels, *Werke*, Vol. 35: *Briefe Januar 1881 – März 1883*, Berlin, Dietz, 1985, pp. 505 ff.

[4] For a comprehensive account, see the classic works by G. Haupt, ‘Marx and Marxism’, in *History of Marxism* (Einaudi), vol. 1: *Marxism in Marx’s Time*, Turin, Einaudi, 1978, pp. 292–314, and M. Manale in *Economie et société*, ‘On the Origins of the Concept of “Marxism”’, October 1974, pp. 1397–1430; ‘La constitution du “Marxisme”’, April–May 1976, pp. 813–839; ‘L’édification d’une doctrine marxiste’, January–February 1978, pp. 163–215.

The Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe in Italy by Roberto Fineschi

The Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe in Italy

Roberto Fineschi 

Source: Historical Materialism

The second Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe has enjoyed a degree of popularity in Italy since the late 1970s.

When its publications began in 1975, Editori Riuniti, a publisher directly linked to the Italian Communist Party, was publishing an Italian edition of Marx’s and Engels’ Opere complete in 50 volumes (MEOC), modelled on the structure of the English Collected Works but translated from the German. Some volumes incorporated new MEGA content;[1] however, the editorial plan was not updated, particularly with regard to the ‘economic’ legacy, which would have entailed the most substantial changes. Only 32 of the planned 50 volumes appeared between 1972 and 1991, when the edition was abandoned due to the political and ideological crisis within the Italian Communist Party.[2]

However, information about the new critical edition was shared before the MEGA publications began. One of the first to engage with this was Gian Mario Bravo, who reviewed MEGA’s 1972 Probeband in Critica marxista. He also had the opportunity to present the major editorial project to the Italian public.[3] Later, Erich Kundel in Rinascita and Mario Cingoli in Rivista critica di storia della filosofia provided further details about the overall project.[4] In 1983, in Rome, on the occasion of the centenary of Marx’s death, the Basso-Issoco Foundation organised a conference entitled La nuova edizione della MEGA (The New MEGA Edition). A report on the event was published in Critica marxista by Nicola De Domenico.[5]

An important moment in the process of familiarising Italian readers with the philological results of the MEGA was the translation of works by some of its most prominent editors, particularly Vitaly Vygodsky[6] and Walter Tuchscheerer.[7]

At that time, there were few translations of previously unpublished texts; one of these was the section of the 1861/63 Manuscript preceding Theories of Surplus Value, edited by Laura Comune Compagnoni.[8] The volume was published by Editori Riuniti in 1980, though not as part of the aforementioned Opere complete. It is introduced by a valuable essay by Lorenzo Calabi, who addresses, from a theoretical perspective, a range of problems concerning the genesis and structure of the text: commodities as the economic cell from 1859 onwards, the Grundrisse as the first draft of a systematic theory, and the 1861/63 Manuscript as the point at which the theories of average profit and rent are developed. The author recognises that these manuscripts can only be properly understood if read as stages in a process with both a past and a future.[9]



In the same years, Nicola Badaloni wrote an important essay on this manuscript[10], where he investigated the concept of ‘subsumption’. Drawing on the Hegelian logic of judgement, especially reflective judgement, Badaloni argued that Marx’s judgement is not grounded in necessity. As a result, the subsumption of the labour process under the process of valorisation is not absolute; it is not a judgement of inherence. Rather, it is a historical and transitory circumstance.[11] The Hegelian transition from reflective to necessary judgement, by contrast, would be metaphysical, as it would hypostatise subsumption.[12] For Badaloni, the historicity of models lies in the way content is distorted by historical forms and their internal legalities, in a process that ultimately reveals how these forms are themselves dissolved and overcome, thereby reaffirming the content.[13]



A comprehensive understanding of the MEGA edition and the debates surrounding its publication also emerges in the work of Gian Mario Cazzaniga[14] and Alessandro Mazzone[15]. Cazzaniga reconstructs Marx’s Stufentheorie, focusing on the relationship between the ‘function’ assumed by the agents of production within the process of reproduction and the ‘conflict’ into which they enter at a certain stage of development. He considers the opposition between the logical and the logical-historical methods to be outdated, favouring the former. In his view, the linear succession of ‘history’ is meaningless in itself; only a theoretical model enables us to grasp the specificity of a historical epoch. This approach, he argues, is not vulnerable to charges of relativism, since Marx consistently maintains that the development of the productive forces represents the continuity across different historical phases. It is rooted in the growing social capacity to meet human needs and to mediate the organic exchange with nature. The epochal outcome of this process is an increase in free time through the social reduction of necessary labour.

Cazzaniga distinguishes between general and particular laws, mediated through the unfolding of the labour process—specifically, through cooperation and large-scale industry.[16] The labour process itself, which is a constant feature of every mode of production, is immediately dual: on the one hand, it is the outcome of natural evolution; on the other, it transforms both nature and itself as one of its own moments. At a lower level of abstraction, however, we must analyse how human beings are the result of the social process of reproduction, which is the true subject of organic metabolism. The potential character of the elements of the labour process becomes actual only in specific historical forms; their various combinations determine the differences between modes of production, and subsequently between social formations. The elements of the labour process are formally always the same, but they become an actual process only within a specific technical configuration, which itself bears a distinct historical meaning.[17]

In this respect, the productive forces are the material bearers of the relations of production. This makes it possible to identify more clearly the specific character of a mode of production: it is a particular form of the labour process in which a development of the productive forces takes place. In the abstract labour process, productivity is expressed as the degree of social division of labour; in the process of social reproduction, it appears as the technical foundation of social production. In this way, social institutions are formed. In its development, this complex relationship presents itself as a contradiction, the potential resolution of which lies in the unfolding of those very relationships.[18]

In order to understand the laws of motion of the capitalist mode of production, Mazzone draws on the central categories of formed content (Forminhalt) and form-determination (Formbestimmung). The form-determinations of capital are, in fact, nothing other than its various modes of operation, subsumed within the process of the formed content through which capital manifests and unfolds itself. The content of this process is the universal — labour as such — but the concept of productive forces and the mode of production cannot be directly deduced from it. Such an approach would not move beyond the abstract, intellectualist deduction of a mere aggregation of ‘ones’. The universal conceived in this way is nothing more than an abstraction, the fixation of a moment within the overall process of production.



Consistent with the Hegelian framework, in Marx too the universal appears in the particular as a process of self-transcendence: it overcomes its determined form in order to assume another that better corresponds to its own nature — in this sense, it is a Forminhalt, or formed content. Thus, in the capitalist mode of production, labour is abstractly human, but it is secondarily and concretely human in its historical configuration. This configuration is characterised by the generalisation of productive activity as an autonomous end, and therefore by the ‘position of individual labour as universal and vice versa’. This implies that human labour acquires a new form of movement that alters the relationship between the subject and object of activity. The capitalist mode of production is therefore nothing more than an epochal phase in the broader history of labour.

Alessandro Mazzone was, in particular, the key figure linking Italian Marxian scholarship with the MEGA editors, due to his sustained collaboration and personal friendships with many of them since the early 1970s.

In 1995, in Milan, on the occasion of a conference marking the centenary of Engels’s death, Rolf Hecker, one of the most important editors of the second section of the MEGA (on Capital and its preparatory works), focused on the editorial work and its exegetical consequences.[19] The author developed a series of distinctions between Marx’s original manuscripts, on which the ‘second fiddle’ worked, and the printed edition published in 1894, emphasising two key interpretative shortcomings. First, there is the mistaken approach to the relationship between the ‘logical’ and the ‘historical’, which has led many interpreters to read the logical development of the theory of capital from a historicist perspective. Second, the invention of ‘simple commodity production’ has replaced Marx’s category of ‘simple commodity circulation’, further contributing to the interpretation of the first part of Capital as a description or theory of a pre-capitalist historical phase whose laws would no longer apply to actual capitalism.

From 1999 and consistently throughout the following decade, the journal Marxismo oggi focused on the MEGA and its publications, largely thanks to contributions from Roberto Fineschi and, later, Giovanni Sgro’ and Tommaso Redolfi Riva. In issues 1–2 of 1999, two articles by Rolf Hecker and Roberto Fineschi introduced the themes, structure and status of the edition to a broader public.[20] These initial occasional contributions became a regular feature in subsequent years, with several articles appearing up to 2010.

The general title of issue no. 1, 2003, was “The Status of the Critical Edition of Marx’s and Engels’ works”, featuring a contribution by R. Fineschi and M. Sylvers: “Novità dalla Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe (MEGA). La grande edizione storico-critica va avanti”, pp. 87–129.

In issue no. 1, 2007, this presence became a more or less regular column titled ‘Novità dalla MEGA’. In this particular issue, R. Fineschi’s piece “La MEGA impresa” appears on pp. 85–96, alongside an interview with M. Neuhaus and G. Hubmann, then director and vice-director of the project at the Academy of Sciences of Berlin and Brandenburg.

In issue no. 1, 2008, the general title was “Nel cantiere delle opere di Marx ed Engels”, and the entire column ‘Novità dalla MEGA’ featured several contributions by Fineschi, Sgro’ and Redolfi Riva (pp. 49–113).

Finally, issue no. 3, 2010, included contributions by Fineschi, Sgro’ and Redolfi Riva on Capital Book II and the related debate in Italy and Germany (pp. 31–105).

In 2001, Roberto Fineschi published a book grounded in the MEGA and its surrounding debate; it remains, and likely still is, the most important Italian study consistently based on the critical edition. The work is devoted to the problem of the ‘logical structure of the concept of capital’—particularly in relation to Hegelian dialectics—and its levels of abstraction. It presents an analysis at the intersection of economics and philosophy, addressing in particular the value-form analysis and the transformation problem, the structural changes in Marx’s concept of Capital over time, the systematic dialectics of the system as a whole, and more.[21]

During those years, there were also contributions that might be termed ‘informative’, such as book presentations, reviews, and similar material.[22]

Alongside Fineschi’s book, a turning point was the 2002 collection of essays edited by A. Mazzone, titled MEGA2, Marx ritrovato.[23] The volume provided Italian readers, for the first time, with a comprehensive overview of the project which, in addition to editorial information, also presented debates on specific topics and perspectives. Thanks in part to the collaboration of scholars directly involved in the edition, the contributions represented the most advanced level of international research. While Alessandro Mazzone’s introduction sought to convey the historical significance of a project that, more than a hundred years after the authors’ deaths, finally aimed to publish their complete legacy, the articles endeavoured to introduce Italian readers to the broad thematic scope of the MEGA. Contributors included Neuhaus, Hubmann, Fineschi, Sylvers, and Hecker.



In the early 2000s, a research project of ‘national interest’ was funded by the Italian Office for University and Research. Several Italian universities, including Milano Bicocca, Bergamo, Siena and Venice, collaborated to investigate the post-Hegelian period and, in particular, to continue the publication of the former Editori Riuniti Italian edition of Marx’s and Engels’ Collected Works based on the new MEGA materials.

Within this project, volume XXII appeared in 2008, containing works from the period 1870–1871, specifically Engels’ notes on war. It was edited by Marco Vanzulli, with translations by Stefano Bracaletti, Vittorio Morfino, Marco Vanzulli and Ferdinando Vidoni.[24]

A significant part of this project was a new edition of Capital, Volume 1. It included not only the traditional fourth German edition of 1890 but also the most relevant variants from the first, second and third German editions, as well as those from the French edition. Italian readers were also provided with the first translation of the manuscripts Ergänzungen und Veränderungen zum ersten Band des Kapitals (1871/1872) and a new version of the so-called unpublished sixth chapter (the Results). This edition finally appeared as volume XXXI in 2011, published by La città del sole in Naples. It was edited by Roberto Fineschi with the collaboration of Giovanni Sgro’.[25]

As part of that project, in 2008 the universities of Bergamo and Siena organised an international conference in Bergamo, promoted by Riccardo Bellofiore and Roberto Fineschi, both members of the International Symposium on Marxian Theory. In addition to the regular members of the symposium, important MEGA editors and contributors such as Roth and Hecker were invited. Heinrich also contributed.[26]

Starting in the early 2000s, another scholar with a different intellectual background and perspective began working within the MEGA environment: Marcello Musto. While Mazzone, Fineschi and others, following the tradition of Vygodskij, Tuchscheerer and the MEGA editors, sought to ‘reconstruct’ Marx’s legacy based on the new materials, Musto was more interested in exploring alternatives. He approached the new manuscripts with greater flexibility, arguing that Marx was implicitly critical not only of future Marxisms but also of several of his own classic ideas. From this perspective, the MEGA serves as a source of materials that need not be used solely to pursue a coherent reconstruction of Marx’s work but rather to open up new understandings of Marx. In particular, Musto investigated the concept of alienation and the writings of the late Marx.[27]



In those years, several publications based on or related to the MEGA appeared. Fineschi published a book on the Marx-Hegel relationship in light of the new editorial findings[28], as well as a collection of essays on the MEGA edition and the related debate.[29] Sgro’ also compiled his contributions from various years into a single volume.[30]

The bicentenary of Marx’s birth in 2018 was marked by numerous conferences, in which the MEGA played a partial but notable role. However, it was evident in most of these events that the edition remains insufficiently known or considered, even among specialists.

One of the most significant outcomes of this development is the publication of a completely revised version of Capital, Volume I by Einaudi, one of Italy’s most prestigious publishers. Featuring a new translation by Stefano Breda, Roberto Fineschi, Gabriele Schimmenti and Giovanni Sgro’, and edited by Fineschi, the book is a thoroughly revised and refined edition of the 2011 version published by La città del sole.[31] It has been positively received, with numerous reviews and comments in the main national press.

All these activities and publications have increased the popularity of the edition in Italy. However, I would argue that the MEGA and its innovations are still not sufficiently known among social scientists. The hope is that, thanks to the publication of the first volume of Capital by a renowned publisher such as Einaudi, awareness of these philological innovations and their significance for the interpretation of Marx will grow.



Notes

[1] In particular vol. 1,with works from the period 1835-1843, edited by Gian Mario Bravo and Mario Cingoli (published in 1980).

[2] Recently the political group and publisher Lotta Comunista has re-published the old 32 volumes and edited the missing 18 ones, following the old plan with some additions from the MEGA.

[3] G.M. Bravo, “La nuova MEGA”, in Critica marxista, n. 6, 1973, pp. 208-211.

[4] E. Kundel, ‘Tutto Marx e tutto Engels in cento volume”, in Rinascita, n. 47, 2 dicembre 1977, p. 40. M. Cingoli, “La nuova MEGA”, in Rivista critica di storia della filosofia, 1978 (33), pp. 247-250.

[5] N. De Domenico, “Sull’edizione critica delle opere di Marx ed Engels (MEGA)”, in Critica marxista, XXI, n. 2-3, 1983, pp. 213-218.

[6] Vitalij S. Vygodskij, Introduzione ai “Grundrisse” di Marx, ed. and trans. by Cristina Pennavaja, Firenze, La nuova Italia, 1974. Vitalij S. Vygodskij, Il pensiero economico di Marx, trans. by Valeria Borlone, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1975.

[7] Walter Tuchscheerer, Prima del Capitale: la formazione del pensiero economico di Marx (1843-1858), trans. by Lapo Berti, Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1980.

[8] Karl Marx, Manoscritti del 1861-1863, trad. di Laura Comune Compagnoni, Roma, Editori Riuniti 1980.

[9] Cfr. L. Calabi, “Introduzione a Karl Marx”, Manoscritti del 1861-1863, Roma, Editori Riuniti 1980.

[10] Cfr. N. Badaloni, Dialettica del capitale, Roma, Editori Riuniti, 1980.

[11] Badaloni, Dialettica del capitale, pp. 10–13.

[12] Badaloni, Dialettica del capitale, pp. 49–51.

[13] Badaloni, Dialettica del capitale, p. 12.

[14] G.M. Cazzaniga, Funzione e conflitto. Forme e classi nella teoria marxiana dello sviluppo, Napoli, Liguori, 1981.

[15] Cfr. A. Mazzone, La temporalità specifica del modo di produzione capitalistico, in: Marx ed i suoi critici, Urbino, Quattroventi, pp. 224-60.

[16] Cazzaniga, Funzione e conflitto, pp. 11-13.

[17] Cazzaniga, Funzione e conflitto, pp. 32, 258–9

[18] Cazzaniga, Funzione e conflitto, pp. 28ff.

[19] R. Hecker, “Engels editore del Capitale”, in Friedrich Engels cent’anni dopo. Ipotesi per un bilancio critico, a cura di M. Cingoli, Milano, Teti, 1998, pp. 312-323.

[20] R. Hecker, “Un resoconto bibliografico della ricerca su Marx ed Engels e della pubblicazione delle loro opere in ambito internazionale”, in Marxismo oggi, no. 1-2, 1999, pp. 175-198, R. Fineschi, “Karl Marx dopo l’edizione storico-critica (MEGA2): un nuovo oggetto di ricercar”, ivi, pp. 199-239.

[21] R. Fineschi, Ripartire da Marx. Processo storico ed economia politica nella teoria del “capitale”, Napoli, Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici –La Città del Sole, 2001. A second edition with the title La logica del capitale. Ripartire da Marx appeared in 2021 in Naples for the Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici.

[22] B. Bongiovanni, “Leggere Marx dopo il marxismo. Per una storia della Gesamtausgabe”, in Belfagor, 5/1995, pp. 579-591. B. Bongiovanni, “Da icona a classico, ‘Io non sono affatto marxista’”, in L’indice dei libri del mese, n. 7-8, 2001, p. 9; M. Sylvers, “Come Marx e Engels hanno lavorato: le loro biblioteche e l’edizione storico-critica delle loro opere (MEGA)”, in Studi Storici Luigi Simeoni, vol. LI (2001), pp. 115-134; Id., “Uomini colti ed impegnati”, in L’indice dei libri del mese, n. 7-8, 2001, p. 8 (Recensione del vol. MEGA III/10, Corrispondenza settembre 1859-maggio 1860).

[23] MEGA2: Marx ritrovato, a cura di A. Mazzone, Roma, Mediaprint 2002. In 2013, the book was reprinted with a new introduction by R. Fineschi.

[24] K. Marx, F. Engels, Opere, vol. XXII: luglio 1870-ottobre 1871, Napoli, La città del sole, 2008.

[25] K. Marx, Opere, vol. XXXI: Il capitale, vol. I: Il processo di produzione del capitale, Napoli, La città del sole, 2011.

[26] The proceedings were published in English: Re-reading Marx. New Perspectives after the Critical Edition, ed. by R. Bellofiore and R. Fineschi, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2009.

[27] Among his publications, translated in several languages, see in particular Ripensare Marx e i marxismi. Studi e saggi, Roma, Carocci, 2011, Karl Marx. Biografia intellettuale e politica (1857-1883), Torino, Einaudi, 2018, L’ultimo Marx. Biografia intellettuale (1881-1883), Roma, Donzelli, 2023 (new edition). He also published reviews of MEGA-volumes on magazines such as Critica marxista and edited collections of essays on Marx.

[28] R. Fineschi, Marx e Hegel. Contributi a una rilettura, Roma, Carocci, 2006 (new edition: Marx e Hegel. Fondamenti per una rilettura, Napoli, La scuola di Pitagora, 2024).

[29] R. Fineschi, Un nuovo Marx. Filologia e interpretazione dopo la nuova edizione storico-critica (MEGA2), Roma, Carocci, 2008.

[30] Giovanni Sgro’ MEGA-Marx, Napoli, Orthotes, 2016. Giovanni Sgro’ has also realised new editions of the Manuscripts of 1844 (K. Marx, Manoscritti economico-filosofici del 1844, a cura di F. Andolfi e G. Sgro’, Napoli, Orthotes, 2018, and of the Results (K. Marx, Risultati del processo di produzione immediato, introduzione e traduzione di G. Sgro’, Napoli, La città del sole, 2018).

[31] K. Marx, Il capitale. Libro I: Il processo di produzione del capitale, a cura di R. Fineschi, trad. di S. Breda, R. Fineschi, G. Schimmenti e G. Sgro’, Torino, Einaudi, 2024.

Notes on the Translation of Some Specialist Marxist Terms into Italian and English

Notes on the Translation of Some Specialist Marxist Terms into Italian and English

Roberto Fineschi

Source: Historical Materialism

Adapted and translated by Gregor Benton and Ingrid Hanon

This note by Roberto Fineschi, here adapted, first appeared in Karl Marx, Il Capitale, vol. 1, edited by Roberto Fineschi and translated by Stefano Breda, Roberto Fineschi, Gabriele Schimmenti, and Giovanni Sgrò, Turin: Einaudi, 2024, pp. xxxiv-xlii.

Everyone knows the wordplay “traduttore-traditore (translator-traitor)”: valid in general, it is particularly relevant in the case of Marx and even more so in that of Capital. Marx’s style is that of a scientist and person of learning, but, at the same time, that of one who revels in the brilliance of a seasoned publicist. His language reflects this background, juxtaposing the rigour of systematic argument with polemical sarcasm, a strictly dialectical lexicon with salacious banter, and the linguistic geometries of philosophical German with polyglot slang. It is difficult to render all this in translation. We have done everything possible to reflect the liveliness of his style. As for the more strictly scientific issues, we thought it necessary to devote a few pages to explaining the translation of certain key terms. The choices made in this new edition are in fact linked to the problems that emerged from a comparison of existing translations and the methodological problems that developed in parallel with the publication of the new historical-critical edition. Translating a certain term often implies interpretative choices; if that is inevitable, it seems only fair to make that clear. Below, the reader will encounter a list of fundamental categories, for each of which an Italian translation and theoretical justification is provided. In this way one has the possibility, at least in the case of the concepts listed, to go back to the German and, even where one might disagree with the translator, to know what the category in question is.[1]

Allgemeines, besonderes, einzelnes. Marx showed an interest in these three categories (and the terms derived from them) at least as early as 1857. In the 1857-58 Manuscript,[2] he used them to articulate the concept of “capital”.[3] There was later a discussion about their abandonment and various positions emerged. The fact remains that there is a clear reference to these categories starting with the very first general outline of Capital. Evidently, the three terms refer back to the division of Hegel’s general theory of concept and syllogism.[4] In view of the context of origin, the most natural translation of the three terms would thus appear to be “universal – particular – singular [universale – particolare – singolare]”, adopted, for example, by Verra in his version of the encyclopaedic Logic.[5] These categories are also used in Capital in key roles; think, for example, of the allgemeines Äquivalent, usually translated as “general equivalent [equivalente generale]”, following Roy’s French translation, and later taken up in Engels’ English translation. The German term means, in effect, both “general [generale]” and “universal [universale]”, so one should be able to choose; the fact remains that Marx also uses it in Capital with reference to “particular [particolare]” and “singular [singolare]” precisely as the conceptual framework of the development of the form of value; that suggests that it should be rendered “universal [universale]”. To avoid burdening the reader, however, it is sometimes translated in non-categorical expressions as “in general [in generale]”, “generally [generalmente]”.[6] As far as einzeln is concerned, one is often forced to translate it as “single [singolo]” rather than “singular [singolare]”. At the start of the book, for example, Marx introduces the einzelne Ware, the “singular commodity [merce singolare]”, which is clearly related to money, which will be the allgemeine Ware, the “universal commodity [merce universale]”. If we juxtapose “commodity” [merce] and “singular” [singolare], however, it would seem in Italian to be a commodity with particular and somewhat strange characteristics, not so much a logical category. It will therefore generally be translated as “singular [singolare]” and, when the Italian does not allow this term to be used, as “single [singolo]”. In German, however, it is always einzeln. As for besonderes, it is always translated as “particular [particolare]”.

Arbeiter. Arbeiter is a term tied to a systematic ambiguity. Literally, it designates “he who works [colui che lavora]”, the “worker [lavoratore]”,[7] based on the mechanical derivation of a noun from the verb “to work” by adding the suffix -er. In German, however, it also means “factory worker [operaio]”. One and the same word therefore indicates: 1) the factory worker [operaio di fabbrica]; 2) the non-factory worker [lavoratore non-operaio] within the capitalist mode of production; 3) workers [lavoratori] who existed in times other than capitalist times; and 4) the categorical determination of an individual who works, without any historically determined connotation. If, depending on the context, 1) can easily be translated as “factory worker” [operaio] and 2) and 3) as “workers [lavoratori]”, the problem arises when 1) and 4) overlap, i.e., when Marx speaks concretely of a factory worker [operaio] in relation to laws of the functioning of capital which, although referring in the specific case to the factory worker [operaio], apply beyond the factory worker. If, for Marx, the problem does not exist, because Arbeiter means both, for us to translate in certain cases with “factory worker [operaio]”, even where talking about a factory worker, would cause us to lose sight of the fact that that law applies beyond the involvement of a factory worker. For this reason, in cases of this kind, we prefer to use “worker [lavoratore]” (e.g., when Marx is speaking of the calculation of the rate of surplus value, the determination of wages, unemployment, etc.). In general, however, readers should bear in mind that, in German, one is dealing in all cases with the same word, Arbeiter, so it is up to them to interpret it differently whenever they see fit.

Arbeitslohn. Literally, it would mean “compensation for labour [compenso del lavoro]”, the transfigured and apparent form of the “value of labour power [valore della forza-lavoro]”. In such a formulation, the mystification at the phenomenal level of the original category is more evident. However, since the expression “wages of labour [salario del lavoro]” is cumbersome, we decided to translate Arbeitslohn simply as “wages [salario]”, except in specific chapters in which the concept is explained.

Basis, Grundlage. The two terms might appear to be synonymous. In this translation, however, we chose to keep them distinct, by translating them as “base [base]” and “foundation [fondamento]”.

Beziehung, Verhältnis. Beziehung is translated as “relation [relazione]”. Beziehen, however, is rendered as “refer [riferire or riferirsi]”, frequently in the reflexive form. It was decided to retain this usage as it immediately recalls the terminology current in Hegelian translations. Verhältnis and sich verhalten are rendered by “relationship [rapporto]” and “relate [rapportarsi]” (more rarely with “behave [comportarsi]”).[8]

Darstellung, Vorstellung, repräsentieren. The use of these terms seems explicitly linked to Hegelian categorisation. In the afterword to the second German edition of Capital, Marx refers to the distinction between Darstellungsweise (“mode of exposition [modo d’esposizione]”) and Forschungsweise (“mode of research [modo di ricerca]”).[9] The former, the “mode of exposition [modo di esposizione]”, is said by Marx to be the properly scientific method and does not consist simply in presenting ready-made results; it is rather a process that is constituted in the unfolding, not the unfolding of something that is already done. As such, it is the method of Hegel,[10] except that Hegel, according to Marx, was an idealist because the process of the Idea in this way would actually produce material reality, instead of reproducing it in thought[11] (I do not go into the rights and wrongs of this judgement by Marx). The term darstellen is commonly translated into Italian as “represent/representation [rappresentare/ rappresentazione]”. Vorstellung, on the other hand, is quite different, in that it indicates how the process appears on the phenomenal level to the agents who are its bearers but of which they do not make science, of which they rather merely grasp the manifestation. This second term is also habitually translated as “representation”. To translate the two terms in the same way is to be avoided, for it introduces an ambiguity absent in the German text and cumbersome at the interpretative level, between Darstellung and Vorstellung. To translate darstellen/Darstellung, other editions have sometimes used “present oneself/presentation [presentarsi/presentazione]”. But even this solution is unconvincing, for it seems to suggest that acquired results are being shown, while it is precisely the process of exposition that leads to the acquisition of results. Further ambiguity arises because of the presence of the verb repräsentieren or vertreten, its synonym, both of other editions which mean “represent [rappresentare]” in the sense of “being representative [essere rappresentante]” of something and which has also often been translated as “represent [rappresentare]”. Here, a decision was taken to adopt distinct translations for all three terms, in order to avoid any possible ambiguity: Darstellung = “display, exposition [esposizione]”; sich darstellen = “display oneself [esporsi]”; Vorstellung = “representation [rappresentazione]”; vorstellen = “represent [rappresentare]”; and repräsentieren = “being representative [essere rappresentante]”.

Erscheinung, erscheinen, Schein, scheinen. These terms are also clearly of Hegelian derivation. Erscheinung is, at least from Kant onwards, “phenomenon [fenomeno]”. It is, in Hegel, the necessary manifestation of the essence, the way in which essence manifests itself at the phenomenal level. The phenomenon is thus not mere semblance or inessential surface, but precisely the way in which essence is configured at the level of existence, and this configuration is as necessary as abstract essence; it is thus their connection that is essential, the one cannot exist without the other. The phenomenon is the dimension of the manifestation of essence. If, on the other hand, we take the phenomenal manifestation alone and consider it essential, we have the “semblance [parvenza]”, the Schein.[12] Of the various ways chosen in the past to translate these terms, the most frequently adopted was “appear [apparire]” for erscheinen and “seem [sembrare]” for scheinen. This choice, not through the fault of the translator but because of the semantic possibilities offered by the Italian term (in truth, the problem is found not only in Italian), has led to many bad interpretations. Indeed, appearance has often been taken as inessential in the face of essence, as a bad way of being of it, when, in fact, the phenomenon is a necessary way of being of the essence. Or, vice versa, it has been claimed that essence can manifest itself phenomenally as such, i.e., one tried to work at the phenomenal level with categories relating to essence. To avoid this problem, I decided to systematically eliminate “appear [apparire]”, which can be an ambiguous term, and to adopt the solution applied by Verra in his translation of the Encyclopaedia, by rendering erscheinen as “manifest itself [manifestarsi]”. Erscheinung was rendered “phenomenon [fenomeno]”, with “phenomenal [fenomenico]” as the adjective. Scheinen is translated by “seem [parere]”, Schein by “semblance [parvenza]”.

Form, formal, formell. Again, a Hegelian distinction. “Formal [Formale]”, in the sense of Formbestimmung, determination of form, does not have a negative sense as it might seem to have in Italian. The Form is, in this case, a key category in the conceptual framework of the theory. It is not here to be considered as form separated from content, as a merely formalistic treatment. This second sense is instead expressed by formell, which means precisely unilateral and non-essential consideration of the matter. The latter term will therefore render this second negative sense, whereas “form [forma]” and “formal [formale]” will be used in the first sense.

Gegensatz, Entgegensetzung. Gegensatz is translated as “opposition [opposizione]”, Entgegensetzung as “counterposition [contrapposizione]”, entgegengesetzt as “counterposed [contrapposto]”. In order to render adequately the active aspect of the oppositional relationship, the adjective gegensätzlich is translated not with “opposed [opposto]” but with “oppositional [oppositivo]”. In some cases, the result in Italian created difficulties, which were solved ad hoc by adding the German in brackets. For Gegensatz, “antagonism [antagonismo]” was intentionally avoided, as this would be a significant semantic shift, loading the term with immediate political values; instead, it has substantially logical value in the functional determination of categories. For Gegensatz, “antithesis [antitesi]” is also avoided, again because it is a politically loaded term. In other respects, it would refer to the second moment of the “Hegelian” method, when it should be known by now that thesis/antithesis/synthesis have little to do with Hegelian theory.

Gegenständlich, objektiv, Gegenstand/Objekt. Objektiv is translated by “objective [oggettivo]” and gegenständlich and derivatives by “objectual [oggettuale]”. Objektiv alludes to the objective character, which does not depend on the subject, of a process. “Objectual [Oggettuale]” and derivatives are very frequent, especially in the first chapters; the term literally means “being in front [lo stare di fronte]” of the thing. The verb vergegenständlichen, often used in relation to the action of working, means “to render oneself objectual [rendersi oggettuale]”, “to make oneself an object [farsi oggetto]” that stands in front. The same distinction recurs for the noun pair Gegenstand and Objekt. The latter recurs very rarely, so they are both translated as “object [oggetto]”, while adding the German in square brackets in the latter case.

Gleich, Gleichung, Gleichheit, gleichsetzen. Gleich is translated as “equal [uguale]”; to maintain the internal cross-references between the various terms adopted by Marx, Gleichung is translated as “equality [uguaglianza]”. For the verb gleichsetzen, I preferred “to set equal [porre uguale]” to “equalise [uguagliare]” or “equate [equiparare]”. The term in fact means “to put on an equal footing [mettere alla pari]”, in the sense of “to regard as equal [considerare alla stessa stregua]”. The value relation does not simply show an equality that already exists in itself between the value of commodities; this relation is constitutive of that equality, i.e., the being-value subsists only insofar as different things are considered equal as values. Only in this reciprocal relation do they have value as things of the same nature, not outside of it, and therefore it is only in it that their being equal as value subsists (which does not create their magnitude of value but makes that magnitude count as value). We are therefore confronted not by a mere quantitative relationship but, first and foremost, by a qualitative one. Products per se are not values and only their relationship as commodities qualitatively posits their equality.[13] I translate Gleichung as “equality [uguaglianza]”, i.e., the relationship x commodity A = y commodity B, and Gleichheit, i.e., the concept indicating the quality of being equal, as “equality [eguaglianza]”. Especially in the first chapter, Marx uses expressions such as Rockgleiches and other similar terms that are substantivations (nominalisations) of compound adjectival forms (noun + adjective), strange in themselves even in German, and that mean, in the example given, “something equal to a coat”. In order to maintain the strongly estranging effect of this very peculiar expression, it will be rendered as “coat-equal [abito-uguale]” and so on, as appropriate.

Naturwüchsig. Before Marx, this term was rarely used in philosophical language. Marx uses it to refer to something that is spontaneously generated as opposed to a plan or rational organisation of society. However, it refers not to an absolute “spontaneity [spontaneità]” but to one relative to a specific context. It is rendered by “spontaneous [spontaneo]”; however, bear in mind that spontaneity is not born from a general nature, but from the nature of the categorial system in which the category develops.[14]

Quantum, Quantität. Marx generally uses “quantity [quantità]” when referring to the concept in general and quantum (plural quanta) when speaking of a delimited quantity. Since the occurrences of Quantität are minimal, we translate both terms with “quantity [quantità]”, to make the writing less cumbersome.

Sache, sachlich, Ding, dinglich. In Marx, there does not seem to me to be a differentiation in the use of Sache and Ding, both of which are usually translated as “thing [cosa]”. Marx usually seems to use Ding (and its derivatives) when speaking of the social relation that becomes thing, but there are also occurrences of Sache in this sense. In German, Sache also means the quid of the matter; only in a couple of passages in the first German edition does Marx refer to Sache becoming Ding,[15] i.e., to the social relation as a whole, which constitutes the quid of simple circulation, which with fetishism is ossified into a thing, into the crude materiality of a physical object. However, the difficulty of finding two different terms and their prevalent synonymy has led to both being translated as “thing [cosa]”. In those cases, however, where we have Sache (and its derivatives), we add the German term in brackets, in order to make the difference anyway accessible. More difficult to solve are the adverbial and adjectival forms sachlich and dinglich, which occur frequently in the first part, for which there is no equivalent in Italian. Depending on the circumstances, they are translated as “of thing [di cosa]”, “in form of thing [in forma di cosa]”, etc., with the German in square brackets in the case of sachlich. In some cases, in the second part, the term had the sense of “material [materiale]” and is translated accordingly, with the German in brackets.

Schranke, Grenze. Marx seems to preserve the Hegelian distinction between “inner limit [limite interno]” – Schranke, i.e., the intrinsic logical determination/limitation of a concept in its systematic development – and “external limit [limite esterno]” – Grenze, understood in the sense of “boundary [confine]”. It was initially planned to use “limit [limite]” for the former and “boundary [confine]” for the latter, but this distinction proved impossible to apply across the whole text in a consistent manner. It was then decided to always use “limit [limite]”; in the case of Grenze, the German term will also follow in square brackets. Where the Italian allowed, we used “boundary [confine]” for Grenze.

Stoff, Materie, stofflich, materiell, Materiatur. In Capital, the term Materie appears very rarely, so, usually, the word Stoff is translated as “matter [materia]”. The same word is used to translate Materie, but, in that case, the German is indicated in brackets. On the other hand, both stofflich and materiell occur frequently: the former mainly with reference to words such as “content [contenuto]” and “wealth [ricchezza]”, the latter more generally in relation to both abstract concepts such as the life process and more concrete terms such as “thing [cosa]”, etc. Given that Italian only has the term “material [materiale]” to render the two German words adequately, I decided to translate both with “material [materiale]”, adding the German in the case of materiell and derivatives to make the difference in the original in any case clear. On the other hand, “material [materiale]” as a noun translates German Material. The case of Materiatur is special. The term is unusual even in German and Marx uses it almost exclusively with reference to the commodity-equivalent in which abstractly human labour becomes objectual, materialises. In order to maintain the particularity, the derivative “materiatura” is used.

Stoffwechsel, Formwechsel. Stoffwechsel has been translated in the past as “organic interchange [ricambio organico]” or “metabolism [metabolismo]”. Marx often uses it in connection with Formwechsel, with an obvious interplay between the two types of Wechsel (Eng. “change”), material and formal. Stoffwechsel is translated as “organic material interchange [ricambio materiale organico]”, to be considered in relation to Formwechsel, “formal interchange [ricambio formale]”. However, “formal interchange [ricambio formale]” is too cumbersome, so, for the sake of readability, I preferred “change of form [cambiamento di forma]”.

Umkehren, Verkehren. The terms in question are relevant because they deal with classical interpretative issues such as “inversion [inversione]” and “reversal [capovolgimento]”. It is therefore good to make them explicit; Umkehren and derivatives: “invert [invertire]”; Verkehren and derivatives: “reversal [capovolgere]”. The term umgekehrt, often found discursively, is rendered where appropriate as “vice versa”.

Unterschieden, verschieden. The two terms (and their various derivatives) are translated as “distinct” and “different” respectively, following the relevant translations of Hegel’s texts.

Veräusserung, entäussert, Entfremdung. Veräusserung (with its derivatives) means “alienation [alienazione]”. The term has no metaphysical or existential connotations but refers to the legal meaning of the alienation of a good or asset. Marx makes use of a second term, Entäusserung, which can also mean “alienation” – to which extent it would be a perfect synonym of the first[16] – in a particular sense. It can in fact also mean “renounce [rinunciare]”, “strip off [spogliarsi]”, “denude oneself [denudarsi]” [of] one’s own original form. In the context of the metamorphosis of the commodity, the past participle entäussert is used above all in reference to money, meaning that it is the commodity that has stripped itself of its original corporeal form, or has assumed the “naked” form of money. Money is the “stripped [spoglia]” (entäussert) form of the “alienated” (veräussert) commodity; but therefore, as well as alienated, also “stripped [spogliatasi]”. It should be pointed out that there is no occurrence of the term in the sense of alienation as in early manuscripts. There are (rare) occurrences of “estrangement [estraniazione]”, Entfremdung, in that sense, and of the adjective fremd. Fremd has various meanings in German that are impossible to render with a single Italian [or English] term. It is therefore translated, depending on context, as “others’”, “foreign”, “stranger”, “extraneous” [altrui, straniero, estraneo]. For the verb entfremden, it was decided to use the expression “make extraneous [rendere estraneo]”.

Verkörpern/inkarnieren, einverleiben. The first two terms are used as synonyms. They express the concept of “incarnating [incarnarsi]”, of “becoming the body [farsi corpo]”, of the value that comes to exist concretely in commodity bodies. The term has an explicit theological echo. The third term, on the other hand, indicates the “incorporation [incorporazione]” of labour in an object, i.e., the mixing and objectualising of labour in it and with elements of it.

Wirklich, Wirklichkeit, verwirklichen, reell, Realität, realisieren. In Hegel, we are familiar with the distinction between Wirklichkeit, as reality in act, “effectuality”; and Realität, “reality” as quality in the mere form of existence. Here, it has been decided to use “effectual reality [realtà effettuale]” for Wirklichkeit and “reality [realtà]” for Realität. Wirklich will be rendered by “effectual [effettuale]” – sometimes by “effective [effettivo]”, especially in adverbial form in all cases where “effectually [effettualmente]” seemed doubtful. Reell and real will both be rendered as “real [reale]”. Verwirklichen is translated as “make effectual [rendere effettuale]” and Verwirklichung as “effectual realisation [realizzazione effettuale]”. Realisieren and Realisierung, on the other hand, will be rendered as “realise [realizzare]” and “realisation [realizzazione]”.



Notes

[1] On rare occasions, the Italian language does not permit the use of the terms indicated; in such cases, the German has been retained in square brackets.

[2] (Translators’ note) The 1857-58 Manuscript, also known as the Grundrisse, is a collection of notebooks in which Karl Marx drafted the ideas for his critique of political economy, later the basis of Capital.

[3] These are essentially two indexes – MEOC [Marx-Engels. Opere complete] XXIX, pp. 194-95, 206 – in which Marx outlines the overall exposition of the book on capital. He envisages an articulation according to the categories of universal/general – particular/singular.

[4] Cf. G.W.F. Hegel, Science of Logic, Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1988 (or. ed. 1812-16), pp. 677 ff. It is well known that Marx wrote to tell Engels that re-reading the Logic had helped him greatly in his work (he was writing the 1857-58 Manuscript). Cf. Marx’s letter to Engels of 16 January 1858 (MEOC XL, p. 273).

[5] V. Verra and A. Bosi, Enciclopedia delle scienze filosofiche in compendio, Parte prima. La scienza della logica (Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences in Outline, Part 1, The Science of Logic), Turin: UTET, 1981-2002, (or. ed. 1830), §§ 163 ff.

[6] A case in point, for example, is the “universality of capital” or “capital in general”, where, in German, we always have allgemein.

[7] (Translators’ note) In Italian, a distinction exists between lavoratore (worker) and operaio (factory worker), as in other neo-Latin languages such as French (travailleur/ouvrier) and Spanish (trabajador/obrero). While lavoratore denotes any person who works, including across different historical modes of production, operaio typically refers to a wage worker engaged in industrial or manual labour within the capitalist mode of production. This distinction is largely absent from English, where the term worker tends to cover both senses, or where a compound noun is required as an equivalent to ouvrier, obrero, or operaio, such as manual worker, industrial worker, or factory worker. Although English lacks a direct equivalent for this lexical distinction, a partial parallel exists in the conceptual differentiation – often invoked in Marxist literature – of labour and work. According to Engels, work refers to human activity in general, across all social formations, whereas labour designates the historically specific form of work under capitalism that produces value. While this distinction does not map directly onto the Italian terms, it has nonetheless informed our translation choices: lavoratore is rendered as worker, even though labourer might appear a more literal choice, based on its derivation. Furthermore, the use of labourer to translate lavoratore may be misleading, as in English the term tends to denote a narrower category, typically someone engaged in physical, often unskilled, manual labour. It is, for example, commonly used in reference to agricultural labourers.

[8] (Translators’ note) English does not have two different common words for Beziehung and Verhältnis. To maintain this difference, the German has, where appropriate, been added in brackets.

[9] Cf. p. 17 in this edition.

[10] Cf. Hegel, Encyclopaedia cit., § 18; see also Science of Logic, pp. 492-93 and 955-56.

[11] See p. 17 in this edition.

[12] Cf. Hegel, Science of Logic, pp. 559-60.

[13] In the 1872-75 French translation of Capital, Roy endeavoured to express this concept in the following passage: “It is only the exchange that brings about this reduction by placing the products of the most diverse labour in the presence of one another on a plane [pied] of equality.” This is a passage from the 1871-72 Manuscript, which in a more precise translation from German reads: “The reduction to this abstractum of equal human labour of the concrete different private labours is only accomplished through exchange, which in fact places the products of different labours on an equal footing with one another”.

[14] Here we see the problematic nature of the concept of “nature” in Marx, which takes on, in my opinion, at least in Capital, two antipodal meanings. The term is, on the one hand, associated with the frequent expressions “law of nature” or elsewhere “social law of nature”. Here, Marx does not mean by this term physical nature, or worse still a phantom state of nature, as opposed to social laws; in fact, in general, he refers to certain mechanisms that are established and realised given certain objective conditions (which can be as much natural as social or socio-natural, thus pertaining to what Hegel would call “second nature”) irrespective of the arbitrariness or particular will of the individuals who find themselves acting within them. The law therefore necessarily operates on the basis of its own nature. It seems almost a classical meaning of the term, in the sense of De rerum natura. After all, this law also acts as a law of nature in the sense of blind and iron necessity. In this sense, “nature” has a strong historical-social connotation because it is linked to the “natural” functioning, “according to its own nature”, of a given system characterised socially and historically. In other cases, however, he also uses the term “nature” to say that social laws appear to be laws of nature, not in the sense that they follow a certain necessary nature, but that social laws appear to be properties of things in their “natural” physicality. In the latter case, the flattening of the historical and social dimension to the physical-natural functioning of objects as such is evident. This is the core, first of commodity fetishism and then of capital fetishism. However, Marx always uses Natur and here we will remain faithful to his ambiguous choice, by always translating it with “nature”.

[15] Cf. p. 963 in this edition.

[16] We have uses with this meaning in the unpublished sixth chapter and in internal quotations from Per la critica dell’economia politica [A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy].